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SOCIETY 
 
 
 
This article considers Western Eu-
rope as a principal centre that has been 
attracting migrants over recent decades, 
primarily, in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. The Baltic region states are cho-
sen for demonstration. Although they 
have different proportions of Muslim im-
migrants, Muslim diasporas are the most 
numerous and rapidly growing ones in 
the Baltics. Undoubtedly, Muslim com-
munities across the region enjoy certain 
similarities. The differences they have 
are explained, among other factors, by 
national policies towards migrant inte-
gration. This article aims to identify the 
features of Muslim migration to the Bal-
tic States in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. The authors analyse the timeline 
of Muslim immigration to the Baltic re-
gion. It is stressed that, despite current 
difficulties, Germany and Finland are 
more successful in integrating immi-
grants than, for instance, Sweden and 
Denmark. Just like other Western Euro-
pean countries, the Baltic States have not 
developed a conceptual framework for 
their migration and integration policies 
towards Muslim immigrants. The authors 
describe possible Muslim integration 
scenarios — the Singaporean and Pales-
tinian ones, simulation, and confronta-
tion. Given their apparent conscientious 
refusal to adapt and integrate migrants, 
the Baltic States are most likely to face 
the Palestinian scenario. 
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Rethinking multiculturalism. Regardless of theoretical interpretations, 
the essence of multiculturalism — unity in diversity — is very rarely ques-
tioned. This holds true for the universal determinants of multiculturalism. 
They are recognised by all countries that implement the ideas of cultural plu-
ralism and see a nation as a cultural mosaic rather than a melting pot. These 
determinants are social justice, cultural democracy, and racial, ethnic, reli-
gious, and class equality. 
Even the Baltics, whose politicians had refused to recognise the principle 
of multiculturalism, had to give in before signing the Treaty of Accession to 
the EU (1998). The countries declared their commitment to the principles of 
multiculturalism and readiness to embrace ‘non-Estonians’, ‘non-Latvians’, 
and ‘non-Lithuanians’ as part of their communities. However, these declara-
tions did not stop the authorities from insisting on the ethnic rather than civic 
principle of nation-state building. The national policy was based on the as-
similation model of multiculturalism. What failed in these countries is the 
antidemocratic assimilation policy rather than multiculturalism. 
Discussions on multiculturalism seemed to have approached a point of 
no return when the leaders of powerful Western European states — Angela 
Merkel, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy — named multiculturalism a 
path to state failure and the dissolution of the European community. The crit-
ics of the multiculturalism ideology are taking advantage of the growing na-
tionalist sentiments among Europe’s native-born population. This is happen-
ing in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Major arguments against mul-
ticulturalism include ‘threats’ to the national harmony and cohesion and the 
imminent loss of identity, national culture, traditions, beliefs, national lan-
guages, and national history. Proponents of liberal nationalism, feminism, 
cosmopolitism, etc. — Brain Barry, Susan Moller Okin, and others — do not 
only stress the contradictions in the multiculturalism discourse but also bring 
to the fore its fatal flaws [10; 23]. 
Recognising the failure of multiculturalism, pronouncing it ‘dead’, 
means abandoning a whole range of philosophical concepts of multicultural-
ism and tolerance — from Charles Taylor’s theory [28] to the ideas of au-
thoritative contemporaries. Among the latter, it is necessary to mention Mi-
chael Walzer, who studies the problems of communitarianism, tolerance, and 
cultural pluralism [7], Iris Marion Young, the author of the diversity policy 
concept [31], Chandran Kukathas and Bhikhu Parekh, the proponents of the 
liberal egalitarian and libertarian multiculturalism [17; 24], and Will Kymlic-
ka, who devised the theories of American multiculturalism and multicultural 
citizenship [18; 19]. 
In most regions of the world, cultural differences are growing rather than 
narrowing. Thus, the main problem of multiculturalism — ‘coupling the le-
gal concept of justice and the priority of human rights, which lie at the heart 
of citizenship in a liberal society, with the rights of national, religious, sexu-
al, and other minorities’ [2, p. 254] — is still urgent, regardless of whether it 
is perceived as a theoretical, empirical, or practical issue. 
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Multiculturalism is a major headache for many Western European gov-
ernments and the proponents of multiculturalism and tolerance ideas. 
The timeline of Muslim immigration into the Baltic region. Numer-
ous works analyse the evolution of the ethnic and denominational structure 
and its effect on the transformation of the sociocultural and political space of 
Northern Europe (see the landmark works of Jørgen Nielsen [21; 22]). Un-
fortunately, these studies do not compensate for the lack of statistical data. 
This holds true for the events and processes triggered by the Arab Spring, 
which had a profound effect on the Muslim immigration into the region. 
However, it is possible to create a timeline of the Muslim immigration into 
Western Europe, particularly, the Baltic region states. 
In a simplified form, the Muslim immigration is divided into two peri-
ods. The post-war period — from the 1950s to the mid-1970s — is associat-
ed with mass labour migrations and the current one — from the mid-1970s 
to the present — with the national policies of attracting labour force to Wes-
tern European countries. A more detailed historical analysis yields a greater 
number of periods. 
The first period of the Muslim immigration into the Baltic region dates 
back to ‘time immemorial’. In the 14th century, natives of the Golden Horde 
were summoned to the Polish-Lithuanian lands. In the 18th century, the Prus-
sian king Friedrich II established a Muslim military unit, which brought to-
gether Bosnians, Albanians, and Tatars. Of course, these migration flows 
were rather insignificant and did not result in ethnic and social turbulence. 
The second period is associated with the post-war years until 1975. From 
the early 1960s, Western Europe attracted immigrants — natives to the tradi-
tionally Muslim territories of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Pakistan. In the mid-
1970s, the parliaments of all Western European countries adopted measures 
regulating immigration. 
In the third period, from 1975 to 1995, immigration was regulated by na-
tional legislation. On January 1, 1995, the two major states of the Baltic re-
gion — Finland and Sweden — acceded to the EU. Denmark had been a 
member state from January 1, 1973. At the time, the Muslim immigration 
into Europe and other parts of the world was war-related. After almost five 
decades of peace, the geographical centre of the Muslim world was engulfed 
by violence. 
The fourth period, from 1995 to 2015, is associated with the European 
migration crisis. The composition and features of the Muslim immigration 
into Northern Europe remained the same. However, the immigration entry 
rules — specified in both national laws and EU regulations — did change. 
From the beginning of 2011, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU 
states were faced with the virtually uncontrolled immigration surges from 
North and East Africa and Western Asia. 
The fifth period started in 2015. It is associated with the European migra-
tion crisis. Despite the geographical remoteness from the hot spots, Europe 
has shared the burden of the consequences of the civil wars in Afghanistan, 
Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and other regions of the world. The continent 
became a desired destination for refugees. Some authors believe that the sit-
uation in Northern Europe is the most alarming. 
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Irregular immigration makes it difficult to quantify the precise scales of 
the current Muslim immigration into the region. Thus, one cannot fully trust 
even the official statistics. 
Muslims in the Baltic Sea region: facts and statistics. Grand mosques — 
the masterpieces of the Muslim temple culture designed for Friday services — 
have been erected in almost all European capitals. There are plans to build 
mosques in Tallinn, Riga, and Reykjavik — regions where Muslims account 
for a few percent, permille, or even permyriad of the population. Muslims 
comprise from 5 to 25 % of the Baltic capitals’ residents. There is a common 
problem of Muslim ‘diffusion’, which manifests itself differently in each 
country. 
A common Baltic trend is the decreasing Lutheran congregation. The 
numbers speak for themselves. In 1990, 89 % of Sweden’s population be-
longed to the Church of Sweden. In 2016, this proportion dropped to 63.2 %. 
Over the same period, the congregation of the Church of Denmark decreased 
from 89.3 % to 76.9 %. In Norway, 86.6 % of the population identified 
themselves as belonging to the Church of Norway in 2001 and only 72.6 % 
in 2016. The most dramatic decrease was experienced by the Church of Ice-
land — from 88.6 % in 2000 to 71.5 % in 2016 [12; 13—15]. 
If the trend persists — i. e. the Christian population of the Nordic coun-
tries continues to decrease at a rate of 1 % per year — Christians will ac-
count for only 50 — 60 % of the total population of the Nordic countries by 
2025. Muslims will comprise half of Western Europe’s believers. 
Germany is the stronghold of Islam in the Baltics in terms of the total num-
ber of the Muslim population. According to expert estimates, 4.4—4.7 million 
Muslims lived in the country in 2015 and 82.2 million in 2016 [12]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The proportion of Muslims in the population  
of the Baltic region states and Norway in 2015, % 
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Fig. 2. The increase in the proportion of the Muslim population  
in the Baltic region states and other major European countries 
 
Compiled based on [1] and adjusted by the authors to incorporate the Arab 
Spring data. 
 
Germany’s first mosque was built in the Wünsdorf camp for Muslim 
prisoners-of-war (often dubbed der Lambmondlager — the Crescent camp) 
in 1915. The mosque was demolished in 1925. However, the Muslim strata 
of German society had formed much earlier. In 1745, the Prussian king es-
tablished a Muslim military unit, which brought together Bosnians, Albani-
ans, and Tatars. A corps numbering approximately 1,000 Bosnians was cre-
ated in 1760. The first foreign workers, most of whom came to Germany 
from the rural areas of South-East Anatolia, manifested themselves as part of 
German society in the FRG, soon after Germany had been divided and West 
Berlin had been isolated by a concrete wall. 
Since then, the number of Muslims has been steadily increasing. The 
FRG/GDR division is still discernible on both the economic and eth-
nic/denominational maps. The former FRG is home to three-thirds of the 
country’s Muslim population. There are several reasons for this. The most 
important one is that, until 1990, the only source of immigration into the 
GDR was the Socialist camp. Another reason is that, as surveys show, ‘Eastern 
Germans’ — whose mentality was strongly affected by the Soviet regime — 
express distinctly negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. However, 
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Ossies are much more tolerant to Muslims than Wessies are. In the federal 
states of the former GDR — as well as in Rhineland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Hol-
stein, and Hamburg — teachers are allowed to wear headscarves. 
Although Germany’s Muslim community is heterogeneous, people of 
Turkish origin constitute the overwhelming majority (63 %). Unlike most 
other European countries, Germany has large Muslim communities living in 
rural areas. This holds true for the states of Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, 
Bavaria, and North Rhine-Westphalia [29; 32; 33]. 
Sweden’s Muslim Ummah developed in the 1970s when immigrants 
from Iraq and Iran were joined by the natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(part of Yugoslavia at the time), Somalia, Morocco, and some other Middle 
Eastern countries. Only in 2011 — 2014, Sweden’s Muslim population in-
creased by 2 %. In 2015, Muslims accounted for 7.5 % of the country’s pop-
ulation. The available data suggest that Sweden’s Muslim population is be-
coming the second-largest community in Europe, after Christians (Catholic, 
Protestant, and Orthodox). Muslims comprise the most rapidly growing reli-
gious group across the continent. Islam is the second-largest religion in 
Sweden. There is a Swedish Islamic Academy. Islamic parties have been 
established in the country. Specialised journals are being published. Moreo-
ver, there are fifty Muslim cemeteries in the country. 
Most Swedish Muslims (approximately 75 %) live in the cities — Stock-
holm, Uppsala, and Gothenburg. The Øresund Bridge, which connects Den-
mark’s capital Copenhagen and Sweden’s city of Malmö, creates a continu-
ous territory densely populated by Muslims. 
The first wave of the Muslim immigration into Denmark dates back to 
the 1960s when the country was in search of cheap labour. Immigrants were 
arriving from North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan. Ten thousand Muslim 
families found a new home in Denmark. In the 1980s, forced migrants were 
coming from Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine. Later, refugees from Soma-
lia, former Yugoslavia, and other regions followed. 
According to the official statistics, Denmark issued almost 85,000 resi-
dence permits in 2015. As of April 1, 2016, the country’s population reached 
5,717,014 people, including 501,057 immigrants, 290,333 of which were of 
non-European origin [14]. The data on the Muslim population in Denmark 
are not consistent. The Danish authorities do not register religious affilia-
tions except for that with the Church of Denmark. Danish researchers keep 
track only of registered community members. However, the numbers quoted 
by authoritative local researchers give food for thought. The sociologist from 
the University of Copenhagen Brian Arly Jacobsen quotes the following 
2016 statistics. As of January 2016, 70.9 % of Danish Muslims were citizens 
of Denmark — most of them naturalised. This proportion decreased from 
January 1, 2015 (73.7 %). The total Muslim population of Denmark was es-
timated at 284,000 people (5 % of the population) as of January 1, 2016, and 
263,800 people as of January 1, 2015 (4.7 %). Half of Denmark’s total popu-
lation lives in the capital region [16]. 
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The first Muslim community in Finland appeared when the country was 
part of the Russian Empire. Tatar merchants and imperial officials were 
coming to the Grand Duchy of Finland with their families. The Finnish Ta-
tars integrated into Finnish society. This is a unique example of a successful 
multiculturalism policy, at least, in Northern Europe. 
Before becoming the second largest denomination in the country, the 
Muslim Ummah had incorporated numerous immigrants from Iraq, Somalia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Russia, Albania, Nigeria, Syria, Morocco, and Alge-
ria. At the turn of the century, the number of Muslims in the country exceed-
ed 70,000 people (alternative sources estimate it at 150,000—170,000 peo-
ple). As a result, Orthodox Christians became only the second-largest reli-
gious community. 
As in the other countries of the region, Muslim communities concentrate 
in the cities, primarily, Helsinki (figures 3, 4). There is a mosque 40 km 
away from the capital. Built by Tatars in 1944, it was the northernmost 
mosque in the world. Sometimes, studies mention ten mosques in Helsinki. 
However, they are not separate buildings but spacious prayer halls, most of 
them rented. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Changes in the proportion of Muslims in the cities of the Baltic region 
 
 
 
Yu. N. Gladkiy, I. Yu. Gladkiy, K. Yu. Eidemiller 
37 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Changes in the proportion of Muslims in Western European cities 
 
Norway is not part of the Baltic region. However, this subarctic Nordic 
country is linked to its Baltic neighbours by numerous sociocultural and lo-
gistical ties. In 1992, the country became a member of the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States. 
As is the case in the other Nordic countries, the Muslim population of 
Norway constitutes the most numerous denominational minority. As early as 
2007, Statistics Norway registered 79.1 thousand members of different Mus-
lim communities, which was 10 % above the 2006 level. In 2010, this num-
ber reached 99,000 people. In 2015, 141,000 officially registered Muslims 
lived in the country. Alternative and independent resources insist that the 
real number is 2 — 2.5 times higher. Overall, Muslims account for 7 % of 
the total population of Norway. The distribution of Muslims across countries 
and municipalities is very uneven. Each tenth resident of Oslo is Muslim, 
whereas the proportion of Muslims in Akershus — Norway’s second largest 
city — is 1 in 55. 
Despite its social attractiveness, Norway has not become a desired desti-
nation for migrants. This is explained by the climate and other natural phe-
nomena. There is evidence that families running from wars in the Middle 
East are willing to return to the refugee camp at the Lebanon border because 
their children cannot adapt to Norway’s polar days and nights. Moreover, 
vitamin B deficiency affects children’s skeleton systems and may cause de-
velopmental delays. This holds true for the other subarctic countries. 
Poland has been slightly affected by the ‘global counter-offensive’ of Is-
lam. The country’s ultraconservative, monoethnic, Catholic society is not 
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ready for a diffusion of its national identity, which has happened in France 
and is happening in neighbouring Germany. As a Christian community, Po-
les are not willing to let their society be used in another experiment [25]. Ho-
wever, all this has little effect on the Muslims that managed to adapt to such 
an ‘unfriendly’ Catholic environment. The Muslims, who have become full 
citizens of Poland, are not subject to discrimination. This holds true for both 
Polish-Lithuanian Tatars, who are seamlessly integrated into the local socie-
ty but stay true to their identity and religion, or Somalis, who came to the 
country twenty years ago. 
The country’s 4,000 Muslim Tatar community lives in the three tradi-
tional Tatar villages of Bohoniki, Kruszyniany, and Sokółka and in the cities 
of Gdansk, Białystok, Gorzów Wielkopolski, etc. [25]. The Tatars came to 
the country in the 14th century, when Tatars from the Golden Horde — re-
nowned warriors and merchants — were summoned to the Polish-Lithuanian 
lands. The total number of Muslims in the country is estimated at 30,000—
35,000 people. The Muslim community brings together immigrants from 
‘Socialistic’ African countries, former Yugoslavia and the USSR, Chechens, 
and 7,000 ethnic Poles who have converted to Islam [3]. The latter number is 
an estimate of Poland’s Muslim Religious Association and it requires verifi-
cation. 
The Ummahs of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are not numerous. 
However, that was not always the case, especially, in the Lithuanian lands. 
The first Muslims — a 40,000-strong army led by Jalal al-Din Khan, the son 
of the Golden Horde’s Khan — arrived at the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 
the 14th century. The army was summoned by Grand Duke Vytautas to fight 
against the Teutonic Order in the Battle of Grunwald. After the Order had 
suffered a defeat and lost its military capability in the course of the Great 
War (1409 — 1411), some Tatars remained in the Duchy and successfully 
assimilated into the population. Duke Vytautas organised the Tatar villages 
into a fortified belt along the Žemaitija border. The belt ran across the sur-
roundings of Lithuanian castles near Trakai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Lida, Kreva, 
Navahrudak, and Grodno. 
In 1941, after the Baltics had been occupied by Nazis and turned into 
the Reichskommissariat Ostland, local collaborationists started persecuting 
Jews, Roma, and Muslims. Almost all Muslims fled to Poland. Most of the 
rest were murdered or executed. The total number of the Muslim victims is 
unknown. Lithuania’s Muslim community has never recovered its former 
numbers. Today, Muslims are leaving Lithuania for socioeconomic reasons. 
A rough estimate suggests that approximately 10,000 Muslims remain in 
Lithuania. There are mosques, Muslim shops, and cultural centres but the 
life of the country’s Muslim community is not what it used to be. 
The post-war history of Latvia’s and Estonia’s Muslim communities is 
rather similar, except for several details. From 10,000 to 12,000 Muslims 
live in Latvia (below 1 % of the total population) [12]. Estonia’s Muslim com-
munity has recovered its numbers and it is still growing. The estimates of the 
Yu. N. Gladkiy, I. Yu. Gladkiy, K. Yu. Eidemiller 
39 
number of Estonian Muslims range from 1,500 (officially registered) to 
30,000 people. However, it is safe to assume that there are more Muslims 
living in Estonia today than in Latvia and Lithuania combined. The number 
of Muslims living in Estonia is close to those in Poland. Estonia’s Muslim 
community is very heterogeneous. The supreme mufti of Estonia Ildar Mu-
hamedšin is a Tatar. The majority of the community is comprised of Azer-
baijanis, Turks, and immigrants from Central Asia and African countries. 
The relations between the Muslims and the Baltics’ authorities are rather 
complicated. This concerns both everyday discrimination and political issues — 
such as the construction of mosques in Riga and Tallinn. The EU plans for 
refugee relocation have failed in the Baltics. The few families who had de-
cided to move to Lithuania were faced with almost absolute poverty and ag-
gression from the local population. Having received the first benefits, most 
of them left the country. 
A country of an enormous territory bordered by numerous seas, Russia 
is not a Baltic Sea state proper. Therefore, only the Kaliningrad and Lenin-
grad regions, Saint Petersburg, and some other northwestern territories will 
be considered as part of the Baltic region. Some experts estimate the number 
of Muslims living in Saint Petersburg at 12 — 13 % of the city’s total popu-
lation. 
The secular Soviet traditions affect the estimates of the number of Mus-
lims in Russia. It is usually estimated at 15 — 20 million people, i. e. 13 % 
of the country’s total population. Many Muslims are seasonal workers that 
are not registered or accounted for. Since 2005, multicultural Russia (with 
the prevalence of Orthodox Christianity) has been an observer in the Organi-
sation of Islamic Cooperation (ICO) — an international association that 
brings together 57 countries. Represented in the UN and the EU, the ICO 
strives to become the voice of Muslims across the world. 
Europeanisation of migrants or islamisation of Europeans? The 
models for integrating immigrants into national societies differ in the meth-
ods for the social adaptation of immigrants [4; 7—9; 11; 26; 27; 3, etc.]. 
Some authors argue that France is using an assimilation model, Germany a 
segregation model, the UK a pluralistic model, etc. [29]. Any person born 
in France is considered a citizen, based on jus soli. The French model en-
courages migrants to embrace the host society’s values and behaviour stereo-
types. Immigrants are expected to abandon their former identity. In this case, 
immigrants can be considered full members of the society [5]. 
Germany’s segregation model is based on the jus sanguinis principles. It 
is rather difficult for a person born to an immigrant family in Germany to 
become a full citizen. This leads to the formation of isolated immigrant 
communities. At first, the UK’s pluralistic model was associated with the 
British Nationality Act that created the status of a ‘Citizen of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies’ (primarily, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). After 
1985, the thesis about the ‘multicultural nature’ of British society came to 
the fore. Traditionally, immigrant communities have enjoyed extensive rights. 
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Recently, the UK has limited the inflow of foreign labour to high-skilled 
professionals. To this end, the immigration points system was introduced. It 
takes into account education, qualifications, prospective income, etc. 
The immigration laws of the economically developed Baltic region states 
are based on the above immigrant naturalisation models. In the Nordic coun-
tries, which strive to limit the level of migration flows, it is virtually impos-
sible to acquire citizenship in the framework of professional immigration. 
Exceptions are made for persons with sought-after professions or substantial 
fortunes, capable of contributing to social and pension funds. In the Eastern 
Baltic countries, only business immigration is encouraged. One must meet 
the charter capital requirements to start a business in the Baltics. Brussels’s 
refugee quota system is increasingly at odds with the immigration laws of 
most EU countries. 
There are far deeper contradictions. Integration and immigration strate-
gies are devised by not only the European Commission directorates but also 
Ministers of Integration. The revised Common Basic Principles for Immi-
grant Integration Policy place emphasis on not only immigrants’ adaptation 
to the written and unwritten rules of the host society but also the bilateral 
processes of citizens’ adaptation. Immigration is defined as ‘a dynamic, two-
way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of 
Member States’ [1, p. 160]. This thesis — which is raising concerns from a 
number of states because of the vagueness of the ‘limits of mutual transfor-
mation’ — is being endlessly recited by European politicians and experts. 
Overall, Muslim immigration is a tangle of contradictions. Regardless of 
the selected model, the descendants of immigrants stay within Muslim cir-
cles, preserve their Islamic identity, cultural traditions, and family ties, and 
create a parallel society consisting of ethnicity-based immigrant communi-
ties. Against the background of a decline in the native population, the grow-
ing numbers of Muslim diasporas encourage some authors to declare a 
‘global Islamic counter-offensive’. They associate the process with demo-
graphic, civilizational, and political pressures and consider it a threat to the 
social stability and national identity of Western European countries. 
In most Baltic region states, the fertility rate in the Muslim population is 
well above replacement level. At the same time, the rate of natural increase 
in the native population is either neutral or negative. In terms of the fertility 
rate, ‘islamised’ Sweden has outstripped Finland, where the fertility rate ex-
ceeded the mortality rate in some years. Of course, shifts in Sweden’s demo-
graphic situation owe to the country’s spectacular socioeconomic perfor-
mance. However, the contribution of Muslim multi-child families cannot be 
denied. 
The native population’s concerns about the potential dissolution of the 
major ethnic group are not easily coupled with the propagated ideas of mul-
ticulturalism and tolerance [7; 17—19; 28]. The increasing radicalisation of 
societies in the Baltic region states — as well as across Western Europe — is 
a reaction to the strengthening of the Muslim community. Anti-immigrant 
sentiments might result in an interdenominational conflict. Such a conflict 
may even redraw the administrative maps of states. 
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Germany’s anti-Islamic movement Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen 
die Islamisierung des Abendlandes — Patriotic Europeans against the Islam-
isation of the West) is largely affected by the extreme right and populist 
forces. The movement takes advantage of the citizens’ reaction to increasing 
immigrant flows from the Middle East to organise thousands-strong rallies 
for ‘our culture’ and against ‘religious fanaticism’ and ‘religious wars on 
German soil’, etc. [33]. 
Finland is often quoted as an example of a country with best social adap-
tation practices, which include support for numerous Islamic traditions — 
opening Halal stores, reserving special hours for Muslim women to use pub-
lic pools, providing female doctors at hospitals’ maternity units, publishing 
Islamic literature, etc. However, the campaign to limit the openness of Suo-
mi to Muslim migrants is developing. In 2015, there were several rallies 
boasting slogans such as ‘Islam will destroy us’ and ‘Close the borders’. 
Authors sharing the ideas of cultural pluralism and ‘liberal egalitarian 
and libertarian multiculturalism’ [7; 17; 24; 31] are sometimes inclined to 
exaggerate immigrants’ abilities to integrate into the societies of such coun-
tries as Sweden or Denmark — which are considered the most humane when 
it comes to immigrants. Alas, the prejudice against Islam and Muslims is 
growing in these countries. Only 2 — 3 % of Nordic respondents have a pos-
itive attitude to Islam, whereas 60 %, polls suggest, have an extremely nega-
tive one. In both countries, there are parties taking advantage of the anti-
immigrant sentiments and declaring that migrants from the Middle East are 
not only a heavy burden on taxpayers but also a threat to national cultures. 
Today, one of the most misused headline clichés in mass media reads as 
follows: Europeanisation of migrants or Islamisation of Europeans? 
Possible Muslim integration scenarios. The authors of this article be-
lieve that there are several predictable scenarios of Muslim integration (re-
integration) in Western Europe, particularly, in the Baltic Sea states. In view 
of the cultural and historical landscape or the mental structure of the Baltic 
region’s population, these scenarios are not plausible ‘as is’. They are mere 
examples or templates that have a certain regional identity. Superimposed, 
they will result in antagonism and confrontations. 
The imitation scenario is the most popular integration model across the 
EU’s five largest economies — Germany, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain. 
As was the case in the mentioned countries, enormous sums spent on differ-
ent assimilation programmes did not yield adequate results because of overly 
formalised approaches and the corruption element of the models. In this 
case, adaptation problems are not solved and goals are not attained. Material 
resources are used to repair possible damages. 
Confrontation scenario. This model has been employed surreptitiously 
by the Netherlands and Denmark. Whereas Latvia and Estonia pursue an 
open stateless person policy towards the Russian-speaking population, the 
Netherlands act more subtly. In the past ten years, the Netherlands have suf-
fered reputational damages within the EU and Denmark has incurred eco-
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nomic losses — Muslims across the world are boycotting goods from these 
countries. Muslims are refraining from services provided by companies with 
even an indirect affiliation with Denmark and the Netherlands. The principal 
goal of a confrontation scenario is the physical expulsion of the primarily 
Muslim population through creating unbearable and even impossible living 
conditions. 
The Singapore scenario is one of the most progressive adaptation and in-
tegration models. The system was created out of hopelessness and it is a 
product of Singapore’s internal conflicts. Thus, it cannot be considered a 
long-term or universal solution. In Singapore, there are strict settlement rules 
for different ethnic and religious groups. The compliance with these rules is 
closely controlled by the state. For instance, more than 25 % of Malayans or 
more than 13 % of Indians may not settle within one residential quarter. 
However, there are positive elements too. As soon as the proportion of Mus-
lims living within a quarter reaches 20—25 %, a mosque is built there at 
public expense and it immediately becomes the property of the community. 
Moreover, the state recognises religious civil status acts and Shariah court 
rulings on inheritance issues, etc. Article 152 of the Constitution of Singa-
pore forbids missionary work among religious minorities. This scenario con-
tradicts the basic European values — freedom of choice, freedom of travel 
and residence, and privacy rights. 
The Palestinian scenario seems to be the most plausible in view of the 
immigrants’ conscious rejection of adaptation and integration. In effect, this 
means the ghettoisation of cities and urban agglomerations with a significant 
proportion of Muslim population. This happened in the Gaza Strip. Another 
possibility is the emergence of spacious reservations akin to the West Bank. 
In the aftermath of the Chechen war, after the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
had been established, the Russian Federation rejected the Palestinian scenar-
io. When the situation had improved, Russia spared no effort to integrate 
Chechnya and its people into the Russian Federation. 
All the relevant parties will benefit if the Baltic region states come up 
with a different scenario and find a unique way to integrate and adapt their 
Muslim population. 
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